The ISCIP Analyst, Volume V, Issue 17 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2000-11-11
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume V, Issue
17
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11950
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 5, Number 17 (November 11, 2000) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Asylum seeker from Putin's Russia 
An article in the Sunday Telegraph (5 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) by former KGB 
defector Oleg Gordievsky suggests that the recent arrival of former FSB agent 
Aleksandr Litvinenko in London could have repercussions for President Putin's 
reputation. According to Gordievsky, it was Putin who "instigated" the 
harassment and imprisonment of Litvinenko after the infamous "assassination" 
press conference in 1998. Apparently Litvinenko has also intimated that he can 
prove a link between Putin and the 1999 apartment bombings which killed 
hundreds of Russian citizens and precipitated the current Chechen war. I wonder 
what Tony Blair will have to say to Putin next time they meet, if this information 
proves correct. (For more on Litvinenko, see Security Services below) 
 
Putin makes changes to arms agencies 
President Putin has decreed a restructuring of the state's weapons exporting 
companies. Rosvooruzheniye's director, Aleksei Ogaryov, and Promexport Chief 
Sergei Chemezov have both been removed from their posts in line with a merger 
of the agencies and the creation of a single company to be called 
Rosoboronexport. Andrei Belyaninov, Chemezov's deputy, will head up the new 
agency. Russia's arms export establishment has been through periods of 
consolidation and breakup before, and as Ogaryov points out, exports typically 
fall in the year following any structural changes. (INTERFAX, 4 Nov 00; via lexis-
nexis) Apparently, his argument did not sway the president. It might also be 
noted that the removal and replacement of the directors of these companies 
usually have signaled a change in the political faction in control of the Kremlin or 
government.  
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GOVERNMENT 
New laundering service? 
Vyacheslav Soltaganov, chief of the Federal Tax Police, has called for the 
creation of a financial intelligence service to help rein in rampant money 
laundering, capital flight and tax evasion in Russia. While Soltaganov believes 
the service should be civilian, and kept separate from the Tax Police, he 
envisages a wide-ranging surveillance mechanism that would note all 
transactions exceeding $5,000. (Current law already requires banks to report 
anything over $10,000.) According to Soltaganov, the state has need of "a whole 
monitoring system ... allowing the definition of accounts, names and banks to 
which significant financial flows are directed." The government denies that this 
represents an attempt by Putin to institute Soviet-style police controls. 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 0920 PST, 3 Nov 00; via C-ap@clari.net) 
 
Who caused the crash? 
Deputy Prosecutor General Vasili Kolmogorov announced last month that an 
investigation of the 1998 financial crisis will likely yield criminal complaints 
against government members by early next year. (INTERFAX, 1040 GMT, 25 
Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1025, via World News Connection) Kolmogorov says 
some crimes have already been uncovered, but he would not disclose names 
while the investigation was still ongoing. Still, his announcement is certain to 
make several public servants, past and present, mightily nervous. 
 
Chaika on justice 
In an interview for Rossiyskaya gazeta (21 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1023, via 
World News Connection), Justice Minister Yuri Chaika claimed that his ministry 
had already found, throughout the components of the federation, over 400 
legislative acts which did not conform to federal laws. Chaika then lamented that 
the justice ministry had no punitive powers to compel those regions that won't 
voluntarily correct their legislation to revise their error. He clearly believes, 
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however, that the president supports revisions in the ministry's brief that would 
enable it to go to the courts.  
 
The interview revealed also that at least parts of Putin's regional policy are 
actually being implemented. According to Chaika, the justice ministry works well 
with the new presidential representatives in the new districts, and none of the 
regional justice ministries remains under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. 
The regional ministries are firmly aligned with the federal organs, bypassing 
regional leaders, as appears to be the president's intent. In a note on personnel, 
Chaika says that while three or four years ago the ministry had 3,500 employees, 
now that number is over 500,000. Good to know there are so many people 
working for justice in Russia. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
To flourish... 
The former head of the Soviet KGB's First Chief Directorate Leonid Shebarshin, 
declared in a recent interview with Rossiiskaya gazeta that it is "only logical" for 
an ex-KGB officer who became Russia's president to "promote some colleagues 
of his to some key positions." Shebarshin, now president of Russia's Economic 
Security Service, added that he hoped this trend would continue "within 
reasonable limits" since secret service men are well-educated, well-rounded, 
and, "unlike many politicians, most of them are free of prejudices." 
(ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, 26 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) The latest such major 
appointment is that of Col-Gen Aleksey Shcherbakov, first deputy director of the 
foreign intelligence service since January 1996, to a "hot spot" -- first deputy 
minister of communications and information. (AVN MILITARY NEWS AGENCY, 
0902 GMT, 2 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Other security service newcomers to the 
political arena include: Vyacheslav Trubnikov (former head of the Foreign 
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Intelligence Service) and Viktor Kalyuzhny, now members of the Russian foreign 
ministry (ITAR-TASS, 0751 GMT, 10 Jul 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
via lexis-nexis); officers on the investigation team of the Kursk disaster (THE 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, 28 Aug 00; via lexis-nexis); and the heads of the Central 
and Northwestern federal districts, Georgy Poltavchenko and Lieutenant General 
Viktor Cherkesov, respectively. (VERSIYA, 21 Sep 00; What The Papers Say, via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
...take flight... 
Another Federal Security Services veteran has not been quite so lucky. In 1998 
he "caused a sensation" by holding a news conference "to denounce the alleged 
plot by the Federal Security Bureau" to assassinate the wealthy Russian 
businessman, Boris Berezovsky. Now, after the proverbial third arrest (he was 
acquitted by the court in one case, and the prosecutor's office dismissed the 
charges due to lack of evidence in the second instance), Alexander Litvinenko, 
who claims, among other things, to have information on last year's Moscow 
apartment building bombings, has fled to Great Britain with his wife and six-year-
old son. (LONDON PRESS ASSOCIATION, 1443 GMT, 2 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-1102, via World News Connection) His application for asylum currently is 
being considered by Home Office officials. Since Britain has no extradition 
agreement with Russia, it is unlikely to hand over the former FSB officer. 
(INTERFAX, 3 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
...or fight 
Edmund Pope's trial goes on, though his lawyer thinks that neither the judges nor 
the public prosecutor will attempt to draw it out too much longer. (ITAR-TASS, 27 
Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) There has been testimony, both to his advantage 
(concerning the discrepancy between the reports submitted to court and those 
sent through Pope to Pennsylvania University, the unclassified nature of Pope's 
discussions with Professor Anatoly Babkin and the qualification of the head of the 
"expert commission," Professor Logvinovich), and against him (concerning the 
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expertise of his main witness, Arsenty Myandin). (INTERFAX, 0847 GMT, 30 Oct 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1030, via World News Connection) There are two very 
serious reasons for concern, however. First of all, on 2 November, the defendant 
complained of pain in his legs and back. The Lefortovo doctor signed a note that 
the defendant was suffering from osteochondrosis in his hip and bilateral 
radiculitis -- conditions with some symptoms similar to the rare bone cancer 
which Pope has been diagnosed as having. (INTERFAX, 1543 GMT, 31 Oct 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1031, via World News Connection) Secondly, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has stepped up the pressure on the chief investigator, 
warning that the investigator's job depended on winning the case. (THE RUSSIA 
JOURNAL, 14 Oct 00; via www.russiajournal.com) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Russian diplomacy: still in the game  
Is Russia's foreign influence waning? After nearly bungling opportunities afforded 
by the Yugoslav election results and missing the Middle East summit at Sharm 
el-Sheikh, Russian foreign policy looked as if it might be facing a fresh setback. 
But the diplomatic flurry over the fortnight suggests that the Russian government 
is out to prove its critics wrong. The latest diplomatic push in the Middle East, the 
EU and Yugoslavia suggests that international prestige and economic stakes are 
driving a reinvigorated Russian foreign policy. Accordingly, Moscow has renewed 
its involvement in these and other international spheres, using economics and 
implicitly anti-US rhetoric to re-build its "unique" role as co-sponsor of the Oslo 
process and to reconstruct ties to Europe that might bolster its reputation and 
secure new and lucrative economic partnerships. 
 
Russia's absence from Sharm el-Sheik in mid-October has had little effect on 
Russian involvement in the Oslo process. According to the foreign ministry, 
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President Vladimir Putin has upheld his pledge to gain a "greater role" in the 
process by maintaining "constant contact" with the Israeli and Palestinian 
leadership throughout the crisis. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 3 Nov 00; via 
RussiaToday.com) Indeed, Russia has used its influence as co-sponsor from 
afar, pledging not to take sides in the issue. A series of phone conversations 
between Putin and the two warring leaders as well as a flow of envoys to the 
Russian capital serve as evidence of the appeal of Russia's self-prescribed 
"neutrality" in the matter. According to Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Russia's 
"unique position in the peace process" is due to its "good relations with the Arab 
states" and a "breakthrough in relations with Israel over the past few years." In 
Ivanov's estimation, this position will make it "very difficult to alienate Russia from 
the region." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 23 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com) 
Ivanov's comments not only indicate the importance that Russia places on 
presenting a semblance of neutrality in order to maintain its "unique" and 
diplomatically prestigious position in the process, but also hint at the bruises left 
by its perceived exclusion from the US-dominated Sharm el-Sheikh summit. (See 
NIS OBSERVED, 23 Oct 00) Ivanov's somewhat contrived suggestion that 
"perhaps other statessuch as the EU" should also be included in the Oslo 
process served not as a practical political initiative on the eve of Putin's EU 
summit, but as a further expression of Russian dissatisfaction with US 
domination of the co-sponsorship. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 23 Oct 00; via 
lexis-nexis)  
 
In an effort to enhance Russia's relations with the EU, Putin spent the beginning 
of November in Paris launching a much-hailed "strategic dialogue" which 
effectively overlooked its Chechnya campaign in favor of strengthening economic 
ties with European states. For Russia, better ties to the EU not only could help 
lead the way to WTO admission, but also could provide a much-needed 
economic infusion from Europe in the form of energy purchases and long-term 
investment in the Russian energy sector. (REUTERS, 2 Nov 00; via 
RussiaToday.com) The relationship could offer political rewards as well since 
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Russia and the EU countries have both denounced US efforts to develop 
National Missile Defense (NMD), claiming that this would endanger the 1972 
ABM treaty and possibly spark what Putin has termed "dangerous proliferation." 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 31 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Similarly, in an effort to maintain influence in Yugoslavia, Putin also received 
newly elected Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica in Moscow on 27 October. 
Despite giving belated recognition to the new president after last month's 
election, Kostunica -- who also met with the head of the Russian Orthodox 
Church -- emphasized Russia's and Yugoslavia's historic relationship and 
expressed his hope that Russia would continue to play a role in the region. 
(REUTERS, 31 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com) In exchange, Putin pledged to 
resume gas supplies and argued against Western support for an independent 
Kosovo. No doubt Kostunica's rhetoric was happily welcomed by Putin, since it 
had been unclear if Kostunica would gravitate westward, allowing others to 
"usurp" Russia's influence in the region.  
 
As a result of these initiatives, Russian diplomacy appears to be regaining some 
momentum. For now, Russia is right to concentrate on bolstering as many 
economic ties as possible while simultaneously invigorating its involvement in 
areas of international concern, even if the immediate returns are not immense. In 
the long run, none of these efforts is incompatible with Russian interests in 
regaining its footing both economically and politically. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Richard Miller 
 
Policy entrepreneurship of envoys to federal districts continues to develop 
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Much has been made of Putin's creation of federal districts and their potential for 
expanding his power into the regions. What has not been discussed as often are 
the effects of the envoys themselves on the centralization of power. For instance, 
Viktor Kazantsev, envoy to the Southern District, took matters into his own hands 
and said that he is not satisfied with how things are run in the Chechen republic 
and intends to change it. 
 
Kazantsev claimed that the current administrative structure in Chechnya "has 
already exhausted itself by now," and he blames this for the increased violence in 
the area.  
 
Speaking as if he were the president himself, Kazantsev noted that, "We will not 
allow the third Chechen war. The force agencies are working in a planned 
regime, and no one creates conditions for the reinforcement of the bandit 
formations in Chechnya. However, with such administration and in the existing 
disarray, the rebels actually can intensify their activity. That is why explosions, 
firing, hostage- taking [still occur]. 
 
"We favor absolute centralization of the republic's administration. There must be 
a coordinator who will assume responsibility for the economy, control over 
financial flows, activity of the force agencies -- for everything." (INTERFAX, 1005 
GMT, 14 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1014, via World News Connection) 
 
Federation Council speaker Yegor Stroev has proposed a law defining the roles 
of the seven presidential envoys in the federal districts. The proposal was largely 
ignored, althought Konstantin Pulikovsky, the envoy to the Far East district, 
commented that the law was unnecessary because the envoys may need to 
expand their roles should the need arise. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 28 Oct 00; 
via Russian Regional Report, EastWest Institute) 
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Pulikovsky is absolutely right, and this is why the powers of the presidential 
envoys should be written into law. Putin instituted the system of districts and 
envoys ostensibly to prevent regional leaders from setting up little fiefdoms. It is 
unclear if he has succeeded. It is clear, however, that the potential for seven 
super-fiefdoms is present. Putin's unwillingness to define the roles of his agents 
in the seven federal districts is disturbing. It appears that, although Putin claimed 
that he wanted to implement a "dictatorship of the law," a simple dictatorship 
would also suffice. 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma deputies call for monitoring of US presidential elections  
Yuri Nikiforenko of the Communist Party faction, Gennady Kulik of the 
Fatherland-All Russia faction, Georgy Tikhonov and Viktor Alksnis of the Russian 
Regions group, and independent deputy Nikolai Ryzhkov drafted a bill to demand 
that the United States accept international observers to monitor the American 
presidential elections.  
 
The bill expresses "profound concern about the danger of falsification of the 
results of the U.S. presidential elections, particularly in Texas and California and 
other territories that were forcibly joined to the United States and where the 
forces campaigning for broad autonomous status for these territories within the 
U.S. have come under pressure that infringes upon their inalienable democratic 
rights."  
 
The bill also argues that, because of the great influence of the United States on 
world affairs, American federal elections should not be considered purely internal 
matters. The UN, the authors reckon, should monitor who wins and how. Should 
the United States not agree to international monitors, the authors urge the world 
not to recognize the elections and to call for new elections under the auspices of 
the UN. (INTERFAX, 0612 GMT, 24 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1024, via World 
News Connection) 
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Coming from such emblems of the Soviet past as Alksnis, the "Black Colonel," 
the draft is ludicrous. For the world's oldest constitutional democracy to submit to 
international verification of its democratic procedures (which were erected and in 
full operation a century or so before much of the world had ever heard the term 
democracy), and at the behest of such "champions of the democratic process," 
requires the pen of George Orwell. But perhapse the United States and the other 
established democracies should encourage Russian observation to demonstrate 
how free and fair elections are held.  
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Russia once more focuses on arms industry reform 
The tumultuous changes in Western defense industries driven by the Cold War's 
demise and associated market forces have manifested themselves through 
numerous rounds of consolidations between large defense contractors, selling-off 
of selected defense segments by some companies, and abandonment of 
defense work altogether by others. Russia, which inherited 70-80% of the former 
Soviet Union's defense research and production complex, has been very slow to 
see similar changes materialize. (Vladimir Shamberg, SOVIET DEFENSE 
INDUSTRIES: HISTORY AND IMPLICATIONS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE SOVIET UNION, Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force 
Academy, 2000). In fact, serious attempts to deal with this issue were not begun 
until 1997-98 with the Federal Program for Restructuring and Conversion of the 
Defense Industry, but the initiative was stymied and essentially put on hold by the 
financial crisis of August 1998. Russian leadership is again attempting long 
overdue actions to evolve the defense-industrial complex from the Soviet state-
run economy to an era of reduced resources and a highly competitive 
international arms market. Recent actions and decrees indicate a multi-
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dimensional approach to arms industry reform and survival. The principal aspects 
appear to be: industry consolidation, export sales, and production and 
modernization for domestic use.  
 
Industry consolidation 
With over 1,700 separate arms producers, design bureaus and defense related 
research institutes inherited from the Soviet Union trying to sustain themselves 
on decreased domestic defense spending (less than 10% of the Soviet level in 
1991), the Russians realize that in order to survive, defense industry components 
must consolidate. The duplicative design and production capabilites, and their 
associated overhead costs, are enough to consume the meager spending on 
new procurement each year without achieving any recapitalization of the force 
structure. A recent presidential decree "on measures to ensure concentration and 
rationalization of defense production in the Russian Federation" authorized the 
merger of defense industry enterprises into major holdings - the first real step in 
achieving these reforms. This has resulted in the proposed merger of the two 
large arms exporters, Rosvoorouzhenie and Promexport. The state is to retain a 
51% share in these large holdings to "create favourable conditions for the 
efficient fulfillment of defense orders and of export contracts for shipments of 
military products." (ITAR-TASS, 2123 GMT, 26 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1026, 
via World News Connection)  
 
Export military sales 
Another desired avenue to boost defense industries is through increased 
overseas sales. This aspect apparently is under consideration in conjunction with 
the consolidation efforts. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov chaired a meeting of 
the Presidential Commisssion for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign 
States on 27 October. One outcome of the session was a determination that 
liaisons with foreign states over arms sales and military cooperation need 
"modernizing." 
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Also discussed was a proposal to create a single state agency for conducting 
foreign arms sales.. (ITAR-TASS, 1056 GMT, 27 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1027, 
via World News Connection) (See Executive Branch section) 
 
While data on specific Russian arms-producing enterprises are not readily 
available, given the aggregate level of annual military exports from Russia, it is 
safe to assume a merger of Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport would rank in the 
top ten arms-producing companies worldwide. 
 
The 27 October meeting also decided to focus on increasing the effectiveness of 
Russian military exports and the associated research and development initiatives 
to achieve these results. (ITAR-TASS, 0829 GMT, 27 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
1027, via World News Connection). This is increasingly important in an effort to 
gain an increased market share as the quality of weapons purchased takes on 
greater significance in a shrinking world arms outlet. 
 
Another strong indicator of Russia's desire to promote its weapon systems 
overseas is reflected by Moscow's ongoing negotiations with Turkey over armed 
helicopter sales. The Russians not only have cut prices of the KA-50-2 
helicopters to make the purchase more appealing, but also have made 
concessions, including production licensing and ceding third-country export 
rights, in an attempt to take the lead over the most serious competitor, Bell 
Helicopter of the United States. The Russian delegation to Turkey was led by 
Prime Minister Kasyanov, indicating a strong desire to conclude large export 
contracts. (INTERFAX, 0929 GMT, 25 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1025, via World 
News Connection) 
 
In some cases, Russian military commanders are looking to sell weapons from 
their current inventories as a means of additional financing for military programs. 
The Air Force chief, General Anatoli Kornukov, recently discussed the possibility 
of selling over 800 warplanes including the MiG-23 and MiG-25 fighters and SU-
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25 bombers. (RIA, 2009 GMT, 11 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1012, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Production and modernization for domestic use 
The final aspect of defense industrial support recently under discussion has been 
the concept of recapitalization through production and modernization of existing 
systems for the Russian armed forces. This policy is linked also to the previously 
discussed export sales of weapons since new accounting procedures would 
allow for foreign sales proceeds to be channelled directly back to Russian military 
accounts.  
 
Even with export sale proceeds, current and planned defense budgets call into 
question the ability to carry out a substantial rebuilding program. Nonetheless, 
these ambitions have been expressed repeatedly. However, there has also been 
an increasing prevalence of statements concerning modernization of existing 
weapon systems. This may be in recognition of the fact that, given the current 
budget environment, limited new production with increased emphasis on 
modernizing existing weapon systems is a more desirable way to sustain credible 
force levels and support the defense industrial base. For example, speaking at 
the Novosibirsk Chkalov aviation production association in August, Deputy Prime 
Minister Ilya Klebanov told workers that the armed forces had all of the S-24 
aircraft required, but the plant would gain a significant workload by repairing and 
modernizing the planes. (RIA, 2340 GMT, 2 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0803, via 
World News Connection) 
 
Military-civil conversion 
Decidedly absent from the recent discussions has been further consideration of 
the conversion of defense enterprises to civil use. This was a significant 
component of the discussion in 1997-98, although the program costs from 1998-
2000 were then estimated to be $25.5 billion rubles (in 1998 prices) with half of 
that cost allocated from the federal budget. (SIPRI YEARBOOK 1999) 
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Conversion of defense workers through re-training, and re-tooling the industries 
for civil production, would require significant time and capital investment. It is 
obvious from recent Russian budget discussions that this capital is not 
forthcoming from the government. Whether external sources are willing to 
finance this initiative remains to be seen. 
 
Obstacles 
What are the obstacles to successful reform? There are several related to the 
initiatives outlined. 
 
With modest defense spending increases in next year's proposed budget 
primarily directed to supporting operations in Chechnya and an attempt to fund 
long-neglected personnel accounts, it can only be assumed that investment in 
new defense production will not increase substantially over last year. (ITAR-
TASS, 1138 GMT, 26 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1026, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The de-valued ruble may temporarily entice foreign purchases from both Russian 
production and current inventory. The drawback would be over the long term: as 
portions of production exports are used to help finance foreign debts, state 
indebtedness would increase. Additionally, the diminished real value of the sales 
would generate fewer proceeds to help finance the proposed military budget. 
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to find a possible source of significant capital 
investment which would enable conversion of defense sector enterprises to civil 
production. Even if factories could be converted, the crumbling logistics 
infrastructure in Russia probably would add to production and distribution costs 
of goods produced, making them less competitive in the world market. 
 
Conversion and reduction of defense industries also would conflict with a 
competing vision of restoring Russia's status of military greatness. Numerous 
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Russian officials have called for programs to "rebuild" the military. The Navy has 
called for increases in shipbuilding to repair what the Navy chief, Admiral 
Vladimir Kuroedov, has referred to as a "dismal" current state of affairs, and to 
boost the shipbuilding facilities which have largely sat idle. (INTERFAX, 1327 
GMT, 25 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0725, via World News Connection) His call for 
a 10-year shipbuilding plan is consistent with the long-term, far-reaching maritime 
strategy outlined in a March 2000 presidential decree. (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 
May 00; WPS DEFENSE AND SECURITY, via lexis-nexis) This mismatch 
between vision and resources seems to complicate the decision-making process 
on defense-industrial reforms. 
 
Moreover, as these difficult decisions are delayed or avoided, the defense 
industry continues to wither. Workers are let go as insufficient funds force project 
cancellations and shutdown of facilities. As in the West, the perception of a 
decaying industry also makes recruitment of new talent into the research and 
production jobs more difficult. In a highly specialized industrial base such as 
defense, this has insidious effects. This personnel problem is starting to be 
recognized in Russia as the average age of the defense industry personnel has 
risen to between 54-58 years, close to male life expectancy in Russia. (BBC, 
1345 GMT, 20 Jun 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Ultimately, the decision to utilize the defense industry as a means to stimulate 
economic recovery and growth comes down to a judgment which even the 
Russian authorities may not be able to apprise accurately. On one hand, the 
defense industries are a burden on the economy and must be significantly 
reduced; on the other, the defense industries represent the best of Russian 
technology and talent and therefore must be used as an economic engine to 
stimulate growth. To some extent, both of these views have merit. However, it is 
difficult to obtain data on Russian defense spending and armaments industries to 
conduct any long-term trend analysis on which a rational decision should be 
based. The body of work available in this field suggests Russian hopes for a 
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defense stimulus to non-defense related economic development may be 
overambitious. Utilizing various methodologies, modeling indicates at best a 
minimal positive effect of defense spending on civil sector economic 
development. In fact, in most cases studied, the ultimate effect is a negative 
burden on the economy. (Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, THE ECONOMICS 
OF DEFENSE, Cambridge University Press, 1995) This suggests increasing 
consolidations, conversion and elimination of defense-related enterprises will be 
required to foster positive economic development in Russia.  
 
The questions remain: Will the Russian leadership, maintaining a controlling 51% 
interest in these new private-state driven defense industries, have the will to 
force true industry consolidation with the inevitable cutbacks in jobs and 
programs to achieve efficiencies in their defense industry? Perhaps more 
importantly, will Moscow be willing to temper visions of a military renaissance to 
the reality of constrained resources? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Here a bank, there a bank 
Both good and bad news can be gleaned from Prime Minister Viktor 
Yushchenko's recent threat to resign because of questions concerning his energy 
reform plans. On the one hand, the reforms must be making an impact, judging 
from the level of vitriol they are generating from some of Yushchenko's 
colleagues. On the other hand, the type of impact they are making is unknown 
and, in some ways, highly questionable. Regardless, the reforms have created a 
pretext for Yushchenko's rivals to launch an all-out attack. 
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On 2 November, Yushchenko appeared at a press conference, angrily 
suggesting, "If my work in this job becomes ineffective, then let someone else do 
it." He continued, "I simply will not allow a rape of the government. But I will not 
fight, because I know against whom the war would be. I do not have the means." 
(DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 2 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) The comments 
came largely in response to scathing criticism of his energy reforms by two 
Yushchenko rivals who may or may not be working in concert.  
 
On 31 October, Ihor Pluzhnykov, former chairman of the government-run Oschad 
Bank, released a statement claiming Yushchenko and Deputy Prime Minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko had used the bank to award lucrative contracts to well-
connected energy distribution companies. "The supervisor board of the bank has 
in its possession documents that prove that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have 
given direct orders for the bank to finance the purchase of fuel from certain 
business entities," Pluzhnykov said. (KYIV POST, 1 Nov 00; via KPNews.com) 
He also suggested that Yushchenko had used the bank "as a money bag, not for 
civilized credits, but for the financing ... of doubtful projects." (FINANCIAL TIMES, 
1 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Pluzhnykov's statement, not coincidentally, came just 
days after Yushchenko ousted him from his position. Regardless of its self-
serving timing, however, the attack hit its mark -- especially when grouped with 
other well-timed attacks on Yushchenko's policies.  
 
Directly before Pluzhnykov released his barrage, former Prime Minster Yevhen 
Marchuk released a report suggesting that the cabinet was using "artificial 
means" to create the false impression of increased cash revenue from energy 
payments. Principal among those means, according to Marchuk, was the use of 
certain banks to grant credits to make up cash collection shortfalls.  
 
While many in the press have suggested that Pluzhnykov and Marchuk are in 
some way working together at the behest of their ally, President Leonid Kuchma, 
that claim seems overstated. Pluzhnykov, who is a parliamentary member of the 
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pro-presidential Social Democratic Party, most likely is working at least with the 
approval of Kuchma. Whether Marchuk would put aside completely his past 
differences with Kuchma (most notably being dismissed as prime minister and 
beaten in the last election) is questionable. Although Marchuk is the national 
security advisor and a reform-minded member of the cabinet, it is doubtful that he 
would go so far as to do Kuchma's bidding -- particularly if he could do some of 
his own. More likely, both Pluzhnykov and Marchuk are capitalizing on the 
vulnerability created by Yushchenko's attack on energy oligarchs. It is no secret 
that companies now receiving state revenue from lucrative energy deals are 
vehemently opposed to the prime minister's privatization and transparency plans.  
 
Kuchma himself has recently joined the bandwagon, criticizing the government's 
relationship with Oschad Bank, and it now appears that after over a year of 
private animosity hidden under starched public smiles, the two men are 
displaying openly their dislike for each other.  
 
What will come of this is the big question. It seems obvious that Kuchma is 
attempting to use the situation to tarnish Yushchenko's popularity with the public. 
The Kyiv Post recently reported that "Inter," Ukraine's most popular news 
program airing on state television UT-3, "has been airing lengthy daily reports 
criticizing the Cabinet's efforts to reform the energy sector..." (KYIV POST, 1 Nov 
00; via KPNews.com) It seems unlikely, however, that Kuchma would go so far 
as to replace Yushchenko at such a critical point in Ukraine's history.  
 
All of these machinations, of course, are managing to overshadow the real issue 
-- whether Oschad Bank was used improperly by the government, and whether, 
in the huge scheme of energy reform, the answer is truly important.  
 
Shell to the rescue? 
It appears that there may be a late entry in the European Union-Russia pipeline 
race -- Shell Gas & Power (SG&P). At a press conference on 1 November, 
 19 
SG&P's business development manager suggested that, in lieu of privatizing 
Ukraine's pipeline system, the network should be leased to a foreign company. 
Hans Vos suggested that, if the system of "international gas transportation" were 
offered as a "concession," his company would be interested in operating it. 
(INTERFAX-UKRAINE, 1 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Many have suggested that if an 
efficient, well-financed firm like Shell were to become involved, the capacity of 
the pipeline system could be increased by up to 30 percent. This would increase 
Ukraine's participation in any EU-Russia gas deal.  
 
Vos also suggested "concessions" both of the system for internal gas 
transportation as well as of the underground storage facilities. These, he 
suggested, could also be managed by international firms, although he expressed 
no interest on Shell's behalf.  
 
The Shell conference came at the same time as an interesting article in Vremya 
novosty. In the article, the new US ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pasqual, is 
quoted as suggesting that "the privatization of energy systems and rational 
management of the gas transportation networks" is a priority for the United 
States. In the same article, a Gaz de France representative is paraphrased as 
saying that the privatization of the Ukrainian pipeline system with the participation 
of foreign companies might mean an end to the idea of a pipeline bypassing 
Ukraine. (KYIV POST, 1 Nov 00; via KPNews.com)  
 
While the Ukrainian leadership has not commented on the reported statement of 
the Gaz de France representative, it has responded positively to the Shell Gas & 
Power idea. Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko recently said that the cabinet 
does not support the outright privatization of the pipeline system, but that the 
leasing option is being considered. His statement that "issues agreed on with 
interested parties" will be discussed later, however, suggests that an 
arrangement may be announced soon. (INTERFAX-UKRAINE, 31 Oct 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
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The discussions about Ukraine's pipeline make it clear that one party is not 
interested in managing the system -- Russia's Gazprom. Although President 
Leonid Kuchma last month asked the company to participate in the system's 
privatization, with hopes of using the deal to lower Ukraine's gas debt, Gazprom 
does not seem to have taken up Ukraine on its offer. Instead, it has concentrated 
on creating the structure for its proposed bypass pipeline, shutting out Ukraine. If 
Ukraine can work effectively with foreign companies to modernize its own 
pipeline, there is a slight possibility that Gazprom may regret its decision. 
Regardless, Ukraine's pipeline future looks much brighter in November than it did 
in October. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
KA-BOOM 
Last week the defection of Aleksandr Litvinenko, an FSB lieutenant colonel, 
again focused attention on the questions surrounding the authorship of the 
bombings in Buinansk, Moscow and Volgodonsk which killed hundreds of 
Russian citizens and served as the pretext for Russia's invasion of Chechnya last 
fall. Litvinenko said that repeated threats and "ceaseless persecution by the 
Russian special services" were the reasons for his defection. His attorney 
commented that Litvinenko "fears for his life also because he knows about a lot 
of things, including the explosions of the apartment buildings in Moscow last 
year." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 2 Nov 00)  
 
The defection has raised expectations of sensational revelations about FSB 
involvement in assassinations (the so-called "wet affairs," terminology the KGB 
had borrowed from the prison slang "zamochit"), high-level corruption in the FSB 
and information about security services complicity in the Moscow bombings. For 
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instance, a very well-regarded Russian journalist, Masha Gessen, writes in US 
News and World Report, "People close to the case say that he can prove what 
has been rumored: that the bombings were organized by the FSB, which was 
then headed by the man who is now Russia's president, Vladimir Putin." (US 
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 Nov 00) 
 
While Kremlin insiders, the Russian public and Russia-watchers the world over 
await new information with bated breath, it is useful to review the available 
information linking the security services with the bombings. Although the 
explosions were blamed on the Chechens, no evidence of their complicity has 
surfaced so far. What we have instead is fragmentary and circumstantial 
evidence of FSB involvement. These details constitute the background to any 
revelations which may be forthcoming from Litvinenko. 
 
What do we know? 
1) The sites of the bombings in Moscow were demolished very quickly, leaving 
doubts as to whether the investigation had been completed. An early report by 
Michael Waller suggested that the FSB rushed to bury the crime scenes. "The 
Moscow Times notes in an editorial that the Ulitsa Guryanova bombing site was 
buried just 10 days after the explosion, and the Kashirskoye Shosse site was 
never secured before rubble clearance began the day of the blast. 'Is this 
ignorance?' asks the Times. 'In the capital city of a country where the current 
prime minister, Vladimir Putin, was once its top security official, the assumption 
sells the FSB short. The Federal Security Service has the equipment, know-how 
and political clout required to perform a proper investigation.... Few bombing 
sites are destroyed as quickly as those at Ulitsa Guryanova and Kashirskoye 
Shosse.'" (RUSSIAN REFORM MONITOR, 1 Oct 99) 
 
2) Writing in the Independent on 6 January 2000, Helen Womak described film 
footage brought out of Dzhokhar in December. In the film, a military intelligence 
(GRU) officer, Alexei Galtin, says: "I did not take part in the explosions of the 
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buildings in Moscow and Dagestan but I have information about [them]. I know 
who is responsible for the bombings in Moscow (and Dagestan). It is the FSB 
(Russian Security Service), in cooperation with the GRU, that is responsible for 
the explosions in Volgodonsk and Moscow." Since Galtin had been taken 
prisoner by Chechen fighters, it is possible that his testimony was given under 
duress.  
 
3) The most serious allegations of FSB involvement in bombing apartment 
buildings concern a bomb that did not go off in the provincial city Ryazan. As 
related by the respected Russian human rights activist, Sergei Kovalev (at 
Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian Studies on 23 February), local 
residents called the police fearing they had discovered explosives in the 
basement. They were evacuated from the building and spent the night outdoors. 
First the authorities said that the substance found in the basement was sugar. 
Then they said there were explosives and the sugar was there to facilitate the 
reaction. Then the police identified the suspects. Then they said it was all a 
training exercise for the local police and MVD. "The nation shuddered at this test 
of vigilance but, ultimately, believed the story," Kovalev explained. 
 
Chechen Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov related the events in similar terms but 
added a few revealing details (at a 25 January appearance at the Davis Center). 
Neither the Ryazan police chief nor the Ryazan civil defense chief were aware of 
this "exercise." The MVD went to work in earnest looking for the culprit -- and 
arrested an FSB agent. At that point there emerged the need to concoct the story 
of the vigilance exercise. 
 
4) In March 2000, during the runup to the presidential elections, Unity, which was 
Putin's party, blocked efforts by the opposition to launch a legislative 
investigation into the Ryazan "exercise." In March Moscow newspapers Novoya 
gazeta and Versiya had investigated the possibility that the FSB was engaged in 
a cover-up in Ryazan. Based on those reports, the YABLOKO Duma faction 
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moved to hold a parliamentary inquiry into the Ryazan incident on 17 March. The 
initiative was blocked by other Duma factions, Putin's Unity faction chief among 
them. (www.yabloko.ru)  
 
5) An NTV broadcast about the events in Ryazan brought to light other revealing 
details.  
After the tenants discovered a bomb in the basement, the local police and local 
FSB immediately evacuated the building and forced its inhabitant to spend the 
night outdoors. An investigation was opened. In the morning the local FSB chief, 
Gen. Sergeev, congratulated the tenants, saying that today is "your second 
birthday." In Moscow MVD Minister Vladimir Rushailo made a statement thanking 
the tenants for their heroic vigilance and saying that an investigation was in 
progress. 
 
Two days after the bomb was discovered, FSB Minister Nikolai Partrushev came 
out with the statement that there was no bomb: just an FSB training exercise. 
Apparently the MVD in Ryazan had detained an FSB agent for questioning in this 
case. After Patrushev's statement, he was released immediately.  
 
The NTV program brought together the tenants from the building, FSB experts 
and spokesmen, and various persons from Moscow for a very stormy discussion. 
Five hours of filming on 17 March (during which the tenants flung four-letter 
epithets at the FSB personnel) was condensed into a 45-minute program which 
was aired on 24 March.  
 
The show put the FSB and by extension the government on the defensive. Public 
officials had to confront irate citizens -- a rare occurrence of public accountability 
in Russian society. Moreover, by giving vague, contradictory and evasive 
responses, the FSB officials and spokesmen looked dumb, callous and hostile in 
front of a national audience. 
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The tenants expressed bitterness and anger over the fright they experienced and 
what they regard as the FSB's shameless lies. Moreover, the audience raised 
several very troubling questions which the FSB were simply unable to answer. 
Why is there still an open investigation into "terrorism" in Ryazan if it was a 
training exercise? (Having an open criminal case under the terrorism statute 
allows the FSB -- not the MVD -- to carry out the investigation and to keep their 
files secret.) Under Russian law, training is supposed to involve the personnel 
being trained only; on what legal basis were ordinary citizens used in this 
"exercise"? If this was training, why wasn't there an observer present at the 
scene? How can you draw conclusions if there is no one watching the 
performance of those being tested? Why the two-day delay before Patrushev's 
announcement? How could the local officers mistake sugar for the explosive 
hexogen which they initially said was in the bomb? [NEZAVISIMOYE 
RASLEDOVANIYE (Independent Investigation), NTV, 24 Mar 00] 
 
The show humiliated the FSB, including top officials like its spokesman 
Alexander Zhdanovich, and seriously undermined the official dogma. If a real 
bomb in Ryazan was set by the FSB, perhaps the other, very deadly bombs in 
Russian cities were also set by the FSB. At least, that is what the tenants of that 
Ryazan building told the nation. 
 
6) Igor Malashenko, the deputy director of Media Most, the parent company of 
NTV, said that the "Ryazan Sugar" broadcast was a major irritant in the 
company's relations with the FSB and the government. (Speaking at the JFK 
School of Government, 24 Oct 00) Information Minister Mikhail Lesin had told 
Malashenko on several occasions that by airing that show NTV "crossed the line 
and that we were outlaws in their eyes." Similarly, on 12 May Moskovski 
komsomolets, one of Moscow's largest papers, commented on the "Ryazan 
Sugar" broadcast and noted "Putin took it very personally." According to the 
paper, the broadcast prompted the raid against the corporate headquarters of 
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Media Most, during which employees were held at gunpoint for several hours 
while masked men ransacked the offices. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Uzbekistan's role in Central Asian security 
The security situation in Central Asia has been taking shape through several 
developments including Russia's security pact with three Central Asian states -- 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- "for collective defense within the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty (CST)." Shared security concerns over the Taliban and 
terrorist organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which 
continue probing the borders of Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan from bases 
in Tajikistan, were important factors in producing the pact. The collective security 
system, however, lacks cohesion due to the absence of Uzbekistan, the 
strongest local military power in the region according to military analysts. 
Uzbekistan opposes Russian hegemony in Central Asia and recently signed a 
bilateral security agreement with Kyrgyzstan, the first of its kind between two 
Central Asian states. Additionally, Uzbekistan has signed military cooperation 
agreements with other regional powers, such as China and Turkey, challenging 
Russian influence in the region. Russia's latest efforts to form a Central Asian 
bloc inside the CIS contrasts sharply with Uzbekistan's push to look for 
countervailing forces outside the CIS. Uzbekistan seeks to preserve its state 
sovereignty, as well as to prevent the Central Asian states from falling like 
"dominoes" into Russia's sphere of influence. 
 
In October, Russia and its five CST partners -- Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- signed a security pact to create a collective security 
system, including the use of regional forces to defend CST territory against non-
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traditional security threats such as international terrorism. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 25 Oct 00) The collective security system consists of three 
geographic components, including a Central Asian sector (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). This latest effort by Moscow to consolidate security in 
Central Asia within the CST framework is designed to legitimize Russian 
intervention and preserve Russia's lasting military presence on its southern 
periphery. Although Uzbek President Islam Karimov has stressed that the Central 
Asian states should exercise responsibility for their own security, Russian control 
is steadily increasing. Even Uzbekistan agreed to join the CIS Integrated Air 
Defense System in March. 
 
The Uzbek president has criticized Moscow for using the threat of Taliban 
expansion into countries bordering Afghanistan as justification "for pushing the 
region's countries to join forces and urging Uzbekistan to accede to the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty," from which it withdrew in 1999. (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 28 Sep 00; via the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press) After 
leaving the CIS collective security pact, Uzbekistan joined GUUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova), a group that was formed in 1997 
in response to concerns about the upward revision of CFE flank ceilings. (NIS 
OBSERVED, 13 Sep 00) GUUAM member states consult on political, economic 
and security issues. The existence of GUUAM could indicate the "hollowness" of 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty framework and prove a useful alternative to 
the Russian-controlled CST collective security system. Indeed, GUUAM has 
often been viewed as an anti-Russian bloc within the CIS. However, Moscow's 
continued efforts to obtain Tashkent's submission to Russia in the CIS and 
Uzbekistan's membership in a Russian-led collective security system have 
already begun to weaken the GUUAM alliance. (The Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute ANALYST, 14 Sep 00) 
 
President Karimov has also called for greater United Nations involvement in 
regional stabilization efforts. The Taliban's advances in the northern territories all 
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but erased the buffer that existed on the CIS's southern borders with 
Afghanistan. According to Karimov, the international community, including Russia 
and the UN Security Council, need to discuss the "Afghanistan problem" to 
prevent a spillover of the conflict into Central Asia. The Uzbek leader further 
stated "the UN Security Council closely monitors the situation in Kosovo and 
Yugoslavia, but pays no attention at all to Afghanistan." (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 28 Sep 00; via the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press) Karimov, 
who has been a harsh critic of the Taliban, recently softened his position, stating 
"in order to keep the peace in Central Asia it is essential to take into 
consideration the position of the Taliban movement, which is the leading force in 
Afghanistan." (ITAR-TASS, 1120 GMT, 13 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1013, via 
World News Connection) Uzbekistan's president is reportedly considering a 
diplomatic exchange: recognition of the Taliban's authority in Afghanistan for a 
Taliban pledge not to support Islamic militants who are opposing his government. 
Other Central Asian states, however, through the collective security agreement, 
support the use of force to prevent further expansion of Taliban influence. 
(EURASIANET, 31 Oct 00) 
 
Along with internationalizing Central Asian security problems, Uzbekistan is 
looking for help from regional powers outside the CIS. As recently as October, 
Turkey and Uzbekistan agreed to work together to fight terrorism, drug trafficking 
and organized crime. Tashkent already is expanding its security cooperation with 
Ankara by sending Uzbek counter-terrorism units to Turkey for training in 
mountainous areas, places where guerrilla forces are known to operate. 
(INTERFAX, 1515 GMT, 18 Sep 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0918, via World News 
Connection) Moreover, Uzbekistan is seeking Western support through its 
membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program. 
 
Uzbekistan also has accepted military support from China, which has supplied 
Uzbekistan with hundreds of sniper rifles, flak jackets and other materiel to 
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suppress IMU incursions into the Ferghana Valley, a "melting pot" of ethnic 
groups in the heart of Central Asia. China and Uzbekistan also signed a military 
cooperation agreement in August. (ITAR-TASS, 2042 GMT, 29 Aug 00; FBIS-
CHI-2000-0829, via World News Connection) Beijing has stated its concern that 
fighting in Uzbekistan could precipitate renewed terrorist attacks in China's 
northwestern province of Xinjiang, where the Uighur separatist movement is 
based. Beijing also has forged closer ties with the Central Asian states through 
the Shanghai-5 organization. 
 
Non-traditional security threats, particularly militant incursions, have been a 
major source of instability in Central Asia. Uzbekistan is tailoring its armed forces 
to counter these attacks effectively by conducting more realistic training, 
improving command and control, upgrading equipment, as well as becoming 
more compact, highly flexible and mobile. Uzbek armed forces have learned new 
tactics from terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in the region. (JANE'S 
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 23 Aug 00) Counter-terrorism exercises have already 
been conducted in Tashkent and other regions bordering Afghanistan. These 
exercises were designed to increase border security and improve Uzbekistan's 
ability to defend strategically important areas. Additionally, the Uzbek military is 
training with other security forces for rapid-reaction roles. (JANE'S 
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 23 Aug 00) 
 
While Russia remains the dominant regional power, Uzbekistan will continue to 
play a major role in Central Asian security, particularly against non-traditional 
security threats. Most likely Tashkent will continue to expand regional 
cooperation inside the CIS framework in areas such as air defense and through 
security partnerships with other Central Asian states, without acceding to a 
Russian-led collective security structure. President Karimov will continue also to 
pursue alliances with regional powers outside the CIS and the West to battle 
Russia's strengthening influence in Central Asia. The Carnegie Endowment 
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foresees Uzbekistan and Russia remaining the two major players of any Central 
Asian security arrangements. 
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